This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. It was generated because a ref change was pushed to the repository containing the project "OpenBTS' transceiver retro-fit". The branch, ttsou/fixes has been updated discards 7764ca94ce659dad840dc120bfb9b77be561ccbc (commit) discards 520d21c825c4f856b4faec6ddaa1b653d113fd05 (commit) discards 5463584a9fae40b6a2a4d3beade09ff871bddd64 (commit) via 68475102023be985d45698acb81b888f78db8728 (commit) via 7b9ac673752d8831a785bfc1af0029389f4814bf (commit) This update added new revisions after undoing existing revisions. That is to say, the old revision is not a strict subset of the new revision. This situation occurs when you --force push a change and generate a repository containing something like this: * -- * -- B -- O -- O -- O (7764ca94ce659dad840dc120bfb9b77be561ccbc) \ N -- N -- N (68475102023be985d45698acb81b888f78db8728) When this happens we assume that you've already had alert emails for all of the O revisions, and so we here report only the revisions in the N branch from the common base, B. Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those revisions in full, below. - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- http://cgit.osmocom.org/osmo-trx/commit/?id=68475102023be985d45698acb81b888f... commit 68475102023be985d45698acb81b888f78db8728 Author: Tom Tsou <tom.tsou@ettus.com> Date: Thu Apr 28 21:55:17 2016 -0700 common: Add mandatory length field to UDP receive calls Current UDP receive reads up to MAX_UDP_LENGTH bytes into the passed in buffer, which may lead to buffer overflow if the write buffer is of insufficient size. Add mandatory length argument to UDP socket receive calls. Signed-off-by: Tom Tsou <tom.tsou@ettus.com> http://cgit.osmocom.org/osmo-trx/commit/?id=7b9ac673752d8831a785bfc1af002938... commit 7b9ac673752d8831a785bfc1af0029389f4814bf Author: Tom Tsou <tom.tsou@ettus.com> Date: Thu Apr 28 21:24:53 2016 -0700 common: Restrict UDP binding to localhost only Reported security vulnerability where control and data UDP packets can be injected into the transceiver externally due to socket binding to all interfaces using INADDR_ANY. Existing socket interface does not allow specifying local address; only the local port and remote address/port are arguments. Restrict socket bind to localhost with INADDR_LOOPBACK. If external interfaces do need to be used, the API should be modified to allow specifying the local socket address. Signed-off-by: Tom Tsou <tom.tsou@ettus.com> ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: Transceiver52M/Transceiver.cpp | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) hooks/post-receive -- OpenBTS' transceiver retro-fit