n0k0 has uploaded a new patch set (#3). ( https://gerrit.osmocom.org/c/osmo-bsc/+/42886?usp=email )
Change subject: ipaccess-proxy: reject oversized IPA frame length ......................................................................
ipaccess-proxy: reject oversized IPA frame length
ipaccess_proxy_read_msg() reads the 16-bit IPA frame length from the wire header and passes it straight as the recv() count into a msgb that was allocated with a fixed PROXY_ALLOC_SIZE (1200) bytes, without ever checking it against the buffer tailroom. A peer that advertises a body length larger than the remaining buffer space makes recv() write past the end of the heap allocation (heap buffer overflow).
Reject frames whose advertised length exceeds the msgb tailroom, the same way the other IPA read paths bound the read to msgb_tailroom().
This issue has been assigned the CVE candidate identifier CAN-2026-2051036.
Change-Id: I05137e114eaa99ff0e85eecccf7645c90945214f --- M src/ipaccess/ipaccess-proxy.c 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
git pull ssh://gerrit.osmocom.org:29418/osmo-bsc refs/changes/86/42886/3