randomness of identifiers

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Max msuraev at sysmocom.de
Thu Oct 5 08:55:33 UTC 2017


On 05.10.2017 09:35, Harald Welte wrote:
> Yes, the new apache-style license makes this less of a headache. 

The process of relicensing is not finished yet and it's unclear when it'll be. Also,
I'm not sure when (if at all) newly licensed version will hit all the .deb
distributions which we support.

> So then we conclude for now:
>
> * TMSIs and other temp identifiers: openssl RAND_bytes()
> * random challenges for authentication: also RAND_bytes, or getrandom()?

Both RAND_bytes() and getrandom() might fail to generate random data.
Both use /dev/urandom and might deplete entropy pool.
Both are non-blocking.

RAND_bytes() creates licensing problem (which might be fixed eventually on some of
the supported distributions).

Which argument for preferring RAND_bytes() over getrandom() have I missed?

> * secret key generation (which we don't implement, so far: ?
Do we have any plans implementing it in foreseeable future?

-- 
Max Suraev <msuraev at sysmocom.de> http://www.sysmocom.de/
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